Rhein on Energy and Climate

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is widely expected to usher in a new era EU foreign and security policy. Few people have a clue of what it will really mean. Here are a few indications of what may be in store.

  1. The monthly meetings of foreign ministers will be the locus where EU foreign and security policy will be shaped. The High Representative will substantially influence the outcome of debates, depending on the quality of his/her proposals and authority.
  2. The personality of the High Representative should have a comprehensive experience in foreign policy, and above all the confidence of his/her colleagues. Creating trust and confidentiality among the foreign ministers should be the first priority. Without trust the High Representative is likely to fail, as all decisions will continue to be taken by consensus.
  3. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) will play a vital role in ministerial decisions. It will meet frequently, in plenary or sub-committees and working groups. Its members are seasoned diplomats; in the future they might be secretaries of state, able to commit their governments.
    The Director General of the European External Action Service (EEAS) will chair these meetings.
  4. The EEAS will form the bureaucratic machinery of EU foreign policy. It will act like the European foreign ministry, under the authority of the High Representative. Its five main functions are
    • Elaborating policy proposals for the High Representative;
    • Formalising policy initiatives from the High Representative or ministers;
    • Coordinating all aspects of EU external relations, from trade to aid and energy and environment, with the exception of security matters;
    • Representing the EU in third countries and international organisations, through the network of EU embassies;
    • Issuing visa to third country nationals. This function is likely to fall on the EU external service in view of implementing a coherent EU-wide approach.
  5. The role of national foreign ministers will dramatically change. They will preserve a national role of representation and diplomatic contacts. But as European foreign policy will progressively replace national policies, this role is bound to whither over time.
    They may try to make up for it by two new tasks:

    • Intensive role in the elaboration of EU policy;
    • Support of the High Representative in missions that require intensive deployment of diplomatic skills, e.g. in international conferences, in diplomatic mediations, speaking commitments, international fairs etc.
  6. The High Representative will also be in charge of security policy.
    For these activities he/she will dispose of a separate machinery, composed of EU officials specialised in security issues.
  7. The European Parliament will gain a larger say on EU foreign policy. Its foreign affairs committee will want to play a role similar to that of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The High Representative will have to invest a good deal of energy to obtain parliamentary support for adequate budget appropriations for implementing his policies. Without strong parliamentary support European foreign policy will lack the necessary democratic legitimacy.
  8. The streamlining of foreign policy functions under the Lisbon Treaty is no guarantee for the quality of foreign policy. The EU machinery may blunder like any national government. The functional improvements that the new Treaty contains are likely to have a positive impact on the quality of future EU foreign policy.
    EU foreign ministers will focus exclusively on foreign policy matters, as they will no longer have to bother with internal EU coordination, which will lie in the hands of the General Affairs Council.

    • They will base their deliberations upon policy proposals prepared by the EEAS, which will be composed of high-calibre foreign policy specialists from the EU machinery and member states.
    • There will be more continuity: the HR will be appointed for 30 months, with the possibility for an extension.
    • There will be less friction between Commission and Council, Brussels and national capitals.
    • Third countries will find it more difficult to put a wedge into the EU machinery, thanks to closer links of solidarity and shared interests that will gradually emerge.
  9. The EU will gain in clout by concentrating its external representation in the hands of the HR and, at the highest level, of the President of the European Council.
    There is one exception to this rule: in the UNSEC, the EU will have to rely on its two permanent members (France and UK) and its temporary members to defend its interests. It should be possible to devise a system allowing foreign ministers to define an EU line and “instruct” its UNSEC members to defend common EU positions in New York. In the longer term the EU will only have one single seat in the UNSEC. This will have to happen in the framework of an overdue UN reform.
  10. The new system may lead to “differentiations” between member countries. These may take various forms, e.g. the Iran contact group composed of the H.R., France, Germany and UK, informal consultative groups on specific policy issues, exclusion of neutral countries from certain sensitive military issues.
    Differentiation may contribute to a smoother functioning and decision making within the unwieldy machinery with 27+ participants; but it must be handled with much sensitivity.
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